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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, I examine the effect of explicit relative performance evaluation 
(RPE) on managers’ investment decisions and firm performance. Principal-agent theory 
suggests that firms can motivate managers to act in shareholders’ interest by linking their 
compensation to firm performance. However, firm performance is often affected by 
exogenous factors that simultaneously affect peer firms’ performance, and therefore, 
performance-based compensation may expose managers to common risk that they 
cannot control. In such cases, theoretical models show that firms can improve risk 
sharing and incentive alignment by compensating managers on performance relative to 
peers to remove the effect of common shocks. However, RPE may be ineffective in 
addressing agency costs in practice because firms may select suboptimal peer groups, 
whether because appropriate peers are unavailable or because managers choose 
underperforming peers for self-serving reasons. Therefore, the question of whether 
explicit RPE use in executive compensation reduces agency costs remains unanswered in 
the empirical literature. I take advantage of expanded disclosures mandated in 2006 by 
the Securities Exchange Commission to examine whether explicit RPE improves 
managerial performance as measured by investment efficiency and changes in 
shareholder wealth. 
After controlling for selection bias, I find that RPE firms are generally less likely 
to over- or underinvest than non-RPE firms, consistent with RPE improving decisions 
and aligning managers’ incentives with shareholders’ interests. Moreover, firms that 
 iii 
 
invest more efficiently have higher future profitability and operating performance than 
those that underinvest or overinvest. Second, I find that RPE firms do not generally have 
higher one-year or two-year total shareholder return (TSR) than non-RPE firms in the 
overall sample after I control for other fundamental determinants. However, RPE firms 
that specifically contract on TSR have higher performance than non-RPE firms. Finally, 
I find that RPE firms that choose peers with high common risk have higher returns than 
non-RPE firms: the positive effects of RPE on firm performance increase with the extent 
of common risk captured by peers, consistent with the predictions of principal-agent 
theory. Together, these results suggest that RPE use in CEO compensation plans reduces 
agency costs and improves incentive alignment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Principal-agent theory posits that firms can motivate managers to act in 
shareholders’ interest by linking their compensation to firm performance (Holmstrom 
1979; Diamond and Verrecchia 1982). However, firm performance is often affected by 
exogenous factors that also affect the performance of related firms. As a result, 
performance-based compensation may be ineffective in motivating managers to act in 
shareholders’ interest because it exposes managers to common risk that they cannot 
directly control. In such cases, Holmstrom (1982) suggests that the optimal incentive 
scheme would protect the manager from common risk by measuring firm performance 
relative to that of peer firms. By removing the effect of common shocks from measured 
performance, relative performance evaluation (RPE) enables the principal to compensate 
managers on their effort and events under their control. Therefore, RPE should improve 
risk sharing and incentive alignment, thus enhancing managers’ incentives to increase 
shareholder wealth (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Holmstrom 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
1983; Gibbons and Murphy 1990). In this study, I take advantage of recently mandated 
disclosures to examine whether the explicit use of RPE in CEO compensation plans 
improves managers’ decisions in terms of investment efficiency and increases firm 
performance in a manner consistent with reduced agency costs.1 
                                                 
1 My study accepts companies’ selection of their RPE peers as given and does not investigate how firms 
do or should select peers.  
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Understanding the potential effect of RPE use on managerial behavior and firm 
performance is important for several reasons. First, incentives from relative performance 
measures differ from those from absolute or fixed measures because managers with RPE 
contracts are compensated on a benchmark value that is determined ex-post. In addition, 
over the last several years, an increasing percentage of firms have incorporated RPE in 
compensation contracts. In my sample, RPE use increases from 22% in 2006 to 37% in 
2012 for large firms. Finally, RPE awards represent a significant portion of CEO 
compensation and are therefore likely to influence managerial behavior. For example, 
Bettis et al. (2014) find that RPE awards represent 32% of overall compensation. 
Beginning in 2006, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) requires public 
companies to disclose RPE use and related information about performance benchmarks 
and peers in their proxy statements. Before this data became available, most archival 
RPE research inferred RPE use by regressing firms’ CEO pay against peer groups’ 
performance (e.g., Antle and Smith 1986; Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Janakiraman et al. 
1992; Aggarwal and Samwick 1999; Albuquerque 2009; Albuquerque 2014). As noted 
by Albuquerque (2009), the literature finds mixed results on detecting RPE use because 
of measurement error stemming from assumptions made about the performance 
measures and peer group identification. Gong et al. (2011) and Bettis et al. (2014) utilize 
the new disclosures to investigate firms’ decisions to use RPE and the peers they select. 
To date, however, the effectiveness of RPE in improving decision-making remains 
unexplored.  
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I obtain detailed data on the new RPE disclosures from the Incentive Lab 
database over the period 2006 to 2012. Because firms self-select to use RPE, I use a 
propensity score approach to construct two groups, RPE (treatment) and non-RPE 
(control) observations, based on factors affecting the likelihood that a firm uses RPE. I 
then investigate the effect of RPE on managers’ behavior. One of the major firm 
decisions that managers can directly influence is investment in new projects, which 
includes capital expenditures, research and development, and acquisitions. Prior research 
suggests that managers whose incentives are misaligned with those of shareholders may 
either overinvest (e.g., managers accept low-value projects to increase firm size and 
‘build an empire’) or underinvest (e.g., managers forego high-value investments to lower 
their personal risk or increase short-term income). If RPE strengthens incentive 
alignment then it should reduce the likelihood of over- or underinvestment. I measure 
investment efficiency following Richardson (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009), and find 
that RPE firms are less likely to deviate from expected investment than non-RPE firms, 
which suggests that RPE improves investment decisions.2 Furthermore, I test whether 
RPE firms’ relative investment efficiency increases with the extent to which RPE firms’ 
peers capture common risk. I do not find evidence that the addition of peer-based 
variables improves on the model specification using an RPE indicator, which suggests 
that higher investment efficiency is mainly driven by the use of RPE and not necessarily 
                                                 
2 I follow Richardson (2006), Biddle et al. (2009), and Cheng et al. (2013) in focusing on the deviation of 
firms’ total investment from expected levels and do not examine the risk mix of the investments. Thus I do 
not address the possibility that managers invest at the level predicted by the model but accept projects with 
a different mix of risk than investors would prefer.  
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a function of common risk captured by peers. Finally, I evaluate the validity of my proxy 
for investment efficiency by testing its link to future firm performance and find evidence 
that firms classified as investing efficiently have higher future profitability and operating 
performance than those classified as underinvesting or overinvesting. 
I also investigate whether RPE increases shareholder wealth by testing whether 
RPE firms perform better than non-RPE firms. I proxy for firm performance using total 
shareholder return (TSR) because it directly measures value provided to investors and is 
used by over 75% of RPE firms. I compare firm performance for RPE and non-RPE 
firms after controlling for selection bias by regressing one- and two-year TSR on RPE 
use along with controls for corporate governance, firm characteristics, and investment 
opportunity set. I find some evidence that RPE firms that specifically contract on TSR 
have higher performance than non-RPE firms. In addition, I find that RPE firms that 
choose peers with high common risk have higher performance than non-RPE firms, 
which is consistent with the predictions of principal-agent theory. However, RPE firms 
do not generally perform better than non-RPE firms in the overall sample.   
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, I extend 
the growing empirical literature on relative performance in executive compensation 
contracts to consider the effects of RPE on managerial decision-making. Before the 
SEC-mandated data became available in 2006, the literature focused on identifying RPE 
firms by comparing their CEO compensation with those of various potential peer groups. 
More recent studies have used the new disclosures to examine the determinants of RPE 
use and how firms select RPE peers. To my knowledge, this is the first study to directly 
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examine whether the explicit use of RPE improves investment decisions and firm 
performance, consistent with a reduction in agency costs.  
My study also contributes to the executive compensation literature that links 
compensation contracts to managerial behavior. Many studies examine the relation 
between managerial behavior and compensation plan incentives such as option and 
equity grants (Larcker 1983; Defeo et al. 1989; Lambert et al. 1989; Sanders 2001; Ittner 
et al. 2003; McChesney et al. 2005) and specific fixed performance measures 
(Marquardt and Wiedman 2007; Young and Yang 2011; Shalev et al. 2013; Huang et al. 
2013). My study extends this literature by examining the effects of relative performance 
targets to managers’ decisions and performance outcomes.  
Finally, my study adds to the literature on the use of peer groups in executive 
compensation contracts. Firms use peer groups in compensation contracts for two 
purposes, to benchmark the appropriate level of pay, and to set external performance 
targets. Much of the existing research on peer groups examines the peers selected for 
benchmarking pay levels (e.g., Bizjak et al. 2008; Faulkender and Yang 2010; Cadman 
and Carter 2011; Albuquerque et al. 2013). Peers used in RPE have received less 
attention, but are important because a portion of the manager’s compensation depends on 
the relative performance of the designated peers. Moreover, the composition of peer 
groups used for RPE purposes often differs from that of peer groups used in 
benchmarking pay levels because the groups are used for different purposes within 
executive compensation contracts (Carter et al. 2009; Gong et al. 2011). Therefore, 
findings from peer benchmarking studies do not necessarily apply to RPE peers. This 
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study fills this void in the peer-group literature by examining the effect of peers groups 
explicitly used for RPE purposes.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior 
related literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 presents the descriptive 
statistics of RPE use in compensation contracts, sample construction, and the research 
methods used to test my hypotheses. Section 4 reports the results of empirical tests 
analyzing the effect of RPE use on firm performance and investment decisions. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes my findings and their implications. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Prior Literature 
Agency costs arise when principals (shareholders) hire agents (managers) to 
make decisions on their behalf because (1) the two parties’ interests are misaligned and 
(2) information asymmetries prevent the principal from directly observing the managers’ 
effort. Agency theory suggests that the principal can motivate managers to maximize 
shareholder wealth by tying executive compensation to firm performance (Ross 1973; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Demski and Feltham 1978; Harris and Raviv 1979; 
Holmstrom 1979, 1982; Diamond and Verrecchia 1982). An extensive line of accounting 
and finance studies examines the link between compensation contracts and manager 
behavior. For example, Larcker (1983) finds a positive relation between long-term 
incentive plans and capital investment levels and Larcker (1987) reports that the 
adoption of short-term incentive plans affects the mix of discretionary expenditures. This 
suggests that pay horizon affects CEOs’ incentives, which in turn affects the CEOs’ 
spending decisions. Other studies demonstrate that equity ownership is linked to CEOs’ 
preferences for acquisitions over joint ventures (Datta et al. 2009; Datta et al. 2001) and 
selling, general and administrative expenditures (Banker et al. 2011) while stock options 
are associated with income smoothing (Grant et al. 2009). Further linking pay to 
performance, Bettis et al. (2010) examine equity awards that include performance-based 
vesting conditions and conclude that the specified requirements present meaningful 
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hurdles as well as significant incentives for managers. Together, these studies provide 
evidence that specific compensation package features affect managerial behavior. 
In theory, RPE should strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm 
performance, particularly when the manager is risk-averse and the performance of the 
firm is affected by exogenous shocks. Most empirical research regarding RPE focuses on 
the prevalence of relative performance measures in executive compensation packages 
and offers mixed evidence on whether RPE is used in determining pay. The main 
challenge in these studies is data availability because firms were not required to disclose 
RPE use prior to 2006. In the absence of specific disclosure, these studies look for 
implicit evidence of RPE use by regressing pay on various assumed peer groups, such as 
market indices (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Aggarwal and Samwick 1999), industry peers, 
and similarly-sized firms (Bannister and Newman 2003; Albuquerque 2009; 
Albuquerque 2014). As summarized in Table 1 of Albuquerque (2009), the empirical 
findings about the prevalence of RPE is mixed, likely because the implicit approach 
relies on assumptions about RPE contracts (e.g., the peer group selection and the RPE 
performance measures used) that inevitably lead to measurement error. 
While most RPE studies infer RPE use indirectly, several archival studies have 
examined the explicit disclosure of RPE to understand its prevalence and determinants. 
For example, Murphy (2000) provides descriptive statistics of RPE use in 177 large U.S. 
firms included in the 1997 Towers Perrin’s Annual Incentive Plan Design Survey that 
employ RPE in executive compensation contracts. The study also suggests that the 
abovementioned disagreement on the prevalence of RPE found by studies that identify 
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RPE firms using the implicit approach is likely due to model misspecifications and 
incorrect assumptions about how RPE firms select peer groups. Gong et al. (2011) 
provides support for this claim, finding that implicit tests are unable to detect RPE use 
because they lack RPE contract details such as selection criteria and performance 
metrics. They show that approximately 25% of their sample disclosed RPE use in 2006.  
Tournament theory posits that a rank-order tournament provides an efficient way 
for principals to evaluate and motivate managers when effort is unobservable (Lazear 
and Rosen 1981). Prior experimental studies compare performance resulting from 
tournament (i.e. relative performance) versus individual incentive schemes such as fixed 
pay or piece-rate. Consistent with theory, these studies generally find that tournaments 
are effective in reducing overall risk to managers when some risks are common to all 
managers. This results in higher levels of manager effort in tournaments than individual 
incentive schemes. For example, Frederickson (1992) shows that participants managing 
hypothetical production shifts exert more effort when their bonus is based on their 
performance relative to that of other workers than when they are compensated on an 
absolute benchmark. Hannan et al. (2008) also find evidence that an incentive scheme 
based on relative performance is more effective at driving performance than one based 
on individual performance as long as some risk is common across managers.  
2.2 Compensation Contracts with Relative Performance Measures 
In 2006, the SEC adopted new rules on executive compensation that required 
public companies to report more detailed descriptions of compensation pay practices in 
their proxy statements (Final Rule SEC 33-8732a). Using these new disclosures, I 
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classify a firm as an RPE firm if at least one component of the CEO’s compensation 
package is explicitly tied to the firm’s performance relative to that of peer firms. 
Otherwise, I classify the firm as a non-RPE firm.3  
When explicitly using RPE to determine CEO pay, firms are required to disclose 
their performance measures, goals, and resulting payouts, as well as the identity of the 
peer firms or market index used for comparison. Under RPE, the award structure and 
peer group are established at the beginning of the performance period. Relative 
performance measures can be either accounting-based or market-based. Gong et al. 
(2011) report that over 70% of RPE firms in their 2006 sample use stock returns as the 
performance metric followed by 14% and 12% using ROE and sales growth, 
respectively. Firms may also use more than one performance measure to benchmark 
relative performance (e.g., a combination of TSR and ROIC). At the end of the 
performance period, payout levels for the RPE award are typically conditional on 
achieving specified rankings or percentiles within the peer group or reaching a certain 
value, such as the average TSR for the S&P 500 over the performance period. 
In my sample, an example of a firm employing RPE is Target Corporation. For 
the 2010 fiscal year, the long-term equity incentive plan included relative performance 
requirements for 3-year EPS growth and 3-year market share growth of domestic net 
sales. Each measure determined half of the stock award. In addition, Target employed a 
rank-order approach to benchmark performance against 14 other retail companies. The 
                                                 
3 I consider firms that use peer groups to benchmark the level of total compensation, but do not use relative 
performance targets, to be non-RPE firms. 
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CEO would receive 100% payout for reaching the above-median rank of the peer group, 
increasing to a maximum of 150% payout for attaining 3rd rank or better and dropping to 
0% payout at 13th rank. Appendix A provides two additional examples of RPE contracts 
with excerpts from the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A).  
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Performance targets are widely used to evaluate managers’ performance because 
they provide information on managers’ actions and also offer monetary incentives for 
high performance. When establishing benchmarks in compensation contracts, firms may 
base performance targets on fixed (absolute) benchmarks or the relative performance of 
peers. In the first case, fixed performance targets are set at the beginning of the period 
and are typically based on the past performance of a manager (Murphy 2000). The 
relative performance approach sets the peer group ex ante, but uses the ex-post (actual) 
performance of a peer group as the metric for evaluating managers.  
Although the fixed benchmark method imposes fewer requirements on data 
availability, it introduces several drawbacks according to contract theory. First, a firm’s 
measured performance is a noisy signal for evaluating managerial actions because it is 
often affected by common shocks to the market that are beyond managers’ control 
(Holmstrom 1979, 1982; Matsumura and Shin 2006). This creates a risk-sharing problem 
because managerial performance cannot be assessed easily, which may lead to 
suboptimal decision-making. This effect is exacerbated when managers are risk-averse 
because optimal risk-sharing requires that the firm compensate the managers for bearing 
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the risk arising from common shocks that are beyond their control (Lazear and Rosen 
1981).  
Another potential problem of using single firm performance benchmarks is that 
targets are often set based on past individual performance, which then decreases 
managers’ ex ante incentives to exert effort (Weitzman 1980). This dynamic incentive 
problem, known as the “ratchet effect,” suggests that a manager may withhold some 
effort in order to meet but not exceed performance targets because the outcome is likely 
to affect performance targets in the future. This may lead managers to engage in gaming 
behavior, such as postponing investment decisions or reducing sales, once the current 
year’s benchmarks have been met (Leone and Rock 2002; Bouwens and Kroos 2011). 
For example, Bouwens and Kroos (2011) document that sales managers who are 
compensated with fixed targets and have high sales activity in the first three quarters 
tend to reduce their numbers in the final quarter. In addition, these same individuals are 
also more likely to meet next year’s sales targets relative to those who do not reduce the 
final quarter’s sales. 
Given these concerns with fixed performance targets, Holmstrom (1982) 
suggests that the optimal incentive scheme to motivate managers is to compensate them 
on firm performance relative to peer performance if the manager is risk-averse and the 
exogenous shocks affecting firm performance are common across the peer group. RPE 
removes the systematic risk from firm performance that the manager cannot control, 
therefore providing the principals with a cleaner assessment of managers’ performance. 
In theory, the use of RPE in compensation contracts should result in better risk-sharing 
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and stronger incentive alignment, which should then motivate managers to increase firm 
value (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Holmstrom 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Gibbons 
and Murphy 1990). In practice, firms also cite the need to reduce managers’ exposure to 
systemic risk as a reason for using RPE. For example, Target Corporation adopted RPE 
in 2009 and stating: 
The decision to move to relative measures for PSU payouts is intended to 
ensure that our compensation performance metrics include not only 
performance against our own internal absolute benchmarks, but also 
performance relative to that of our competitors. Absolute measures that 
were used in the past could be greatly skewed by a rapid downturn or 
upturn in the economy, rather than reflecting executives' ability to drive 
performance under those conditions. 
Consistent with the notion that companies use RPE to filter out common shocks from 
performance, Gong et al. (2011) find that RPE firms tend to select peers that have 
similar risk factors and firm characteristics. Moreover, tournament theory predicts that 
selecting peers with similar ability should reduce shirking and suboptimal investing 
(Lazear and Rosen 1981; Hvide 2002). In summary, the explicit use of RPE in 
compensation contracts should motivate managers to make optimal choices to increase 
firm value.  
One of the major firm decisions that managers can influence is selecting 
investment projects. Investments include capital expenditures, research and 
development, and acquisitions, which can ultimately affect future firm performance 
(e.g., Larcker 1983; Lev and Sougiannis 1996; Chan et al. 2001). Managers whose 
incentives are misaligned with the interests of shareholders may make investment 
decisions that maximize their personal welfare but conflict with shareholders’ interests 
 14 
 
(Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976). As such, incentive misalignment 
can lead to either over- or underinvestment. Managers may overinvest because they are 
motivated by empire-building. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) posit that such managers 
prefer to reinvest the firm’s free cash flow in negative NPV projects to expand the size 
of the firm instead of distributing the funds to shareholders. Managers may also 
overinvest by accepting “pet projects” developed internally or acquired from other firms. 
For example, Morck et al. (1990) present evidence that self-interested managers may 
acquire targets that benefit themselves but not shareholders, thus reducing shareholder 
wealth.4 In addition, Titman et al. (2004) shows that firms that substantially increase 
capital investments subsequently experience lower future stock returns, particularly 
when firms have high cash flows and low leverage.  
The use of RPE in benchmarking firm performance may reduce managers’ 
tendency to overinvest by removing the effect of common shocks from firm 
performance, thus strengthening incentive alignment. For example, suppose industry-
wide returns increase because investors increase their growth expectations across the 
industry. Managers who are evaluated using fixed stock return performance benchmarks 
are likely to easily meet the established targets even if they accept some low-value 
investments, and may use the opportunity for empire-building. In contrast, managers 
evaluated on relative performance would refrain from overinvesting when their industry 
                                                 
4 Morck et al. (1990) posit that unrelated diversification benefits managers by reducing their personal risk 
at the cost of shareholder wealth. In addition, managers may expand the firm even though shareholder 
wealth would be higher if managers instead reduced the size of the firm and returned capital to 
shareholders. 
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experiences a positive shock because RPE removes the common shock effect from 
measured performance.  
Prior research also argues that incentive misalignment may lead risk-averse 
managers to underinvest by forgoing some positive NPV projects (e.g., Aggarwal and 
Samwick 2006). The incentives to underinvest are likely to increase when common 
shocks that are outside the manager’s control increase the variability of the firm’s 
performance. This agency problem suggests that managers incur private costs from 
investment, and the resulting suboptimal investment ultimately reduce firm value. 
Consistent with this notion, Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) find that investment 
increases with incentives. Moreover, their model shows that managers’ incentives to 
maintain suboptimal investment levels increase with their risk aversion and decline with 
the variance of firm performance. In the above example of a positive industry-wide 
shock, managers who are evaluated using fixed stock return performance benchmarks 
may reject some positive NPV projects because they can easily achieve the benchmarks 
even with inaction. In this case, RPE removes the common shock effect from 
compensation, thereby strengthening incentive alignment and reducing the likelihood of 
undervesting relative to non-RPE schemes.   
Despite these theoretical benefits, RPE use as implemented in practice may not 
be effective in addressing agency costs. The benefit of RPE hinges on peer performance 
capturing common shocks that are beyond managers’ control. Thus, firms operating 
across multiple business segments may have difficulty selecting a peer group that is 
subject to similar shocks. In addition, tournament theory suggests that firms should 
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select peers whose abilities are similar to those of the focal firm to prevent unequal 
comparisons that may result in shirking. Gong et al. (2011) find some evidence that peer 
selection may reduce RPE effectiveness. Using analyst forecasts, they report that RPE 
firms often choose peers that are expected to trail industry performance, suggesting a 
self-serving bias in peer selection. Therefore, it is not clear ex ante whether RPE use as 
implemented in compensation contracts successfully reduces the tendency to over- or 
underinvest when compared to non-RPE firms. I state the first hypothesis in the null 
form: 
H1:  Firms that explicitly use RPE are as likely to overinvest or underinvest as 
firms that do not use RPE. 
Investments are one of many areas that may be affected by managerial incentives 
and subsequent behavior. Together, these decisions ultimately flow into overall firm 
performance, which directly impacts shareholder wealth. If RPE is effective in 
improving incentive alignment, I expect that managers of RPE firms are motivated to 
make decisions that will maximize shareholder wealth. However, given the potential 
costs of RPE as well as the mixed results from Gong et al. (2011) on peer selection 
choice, RPE as implemented in practice may not result in more value-adding behavior 
than non-RPE firms. I state the second hypothesis for firm performance in the null form: 
H2a:  Firms that explicitly incorporate RPE in CEO compensation contracts do 
not perform better than similar firms that do not use RPE. 
Firms using RPE may contract on a range of performance metrics, including 
market- and accounting-based metrics. Ideally, firms would select RPE metrics that best 
motivate managers to maximize the firm value. However, prior literature suggests that 
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managers often focus only on improving the selected performance measure and take 
actions consistent with those incentives. For example, Wallace (1997) shows that firms 
adopting compensation plans based on residual income measures are more likely to 
report higher residual income, but have lower investment levels, increased disposition of 
assets, and increased share purchases than other firms. With regard to market-measures, 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2007) find that managers are more likely to employ 
convertible bond transactions to increase diluted EPS while Young and Yang (2011) 
report increased stock repurchases when EPS is explicitly used as the performance target 
in bonus plans. As a result, these firms may report higher performance when defined by 
the specified metric, but not necessarily by other performance measures. Given the idea 
that “you get what you measure,” I hypothesize that RPE firms are more likely to have 
higher firm performance for the performance metric included in the RPE contract and 
state the directional hypothesis as follows:  
H2b:  Firms that explicitly incorporate RPE in CEO compensation contracts 
perform better than similar non-RPE firms on the contracted 
performance metric. 
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
I present all tables referenced in the manuscript in Appendix C. Table 1 
summarizes sample construction. I start with 8,493 firm-year observations reported in 
Incentive Lab with compensation contract data between 2006 and 2012. Incentive Lab 
provides detailed data on compensation plans disclosed in proxy statements for the 
largest 750 firms for each year using the market value of equity. In addition, the database 
backfills and forward-fills data for firms entering and leaving the group of largest firms. 
Because the SEC’s new disclosure rules for executive compensation became effective on 
December 15, 2006, I include only observations with fiscal years ending on or after this 
mandatory compliance date. This data step reduces the number of observations in the 
2006 calendar year from 1,293 firms to 956 firms (26%). Therefore, my sample retains 
most of the 2006 firms after conditioning on mandatory disclosure of compensation 
contracts. I drop firm-year observations missing data to construct the variables required 
in the propensity-score model (see Equation 1). I obtain financial data from Compustat, 
market data from CRSP, CEO characteristics (age) from Execucomp, institutional 
ownership data from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F), and information on 
the board of directors from BoardEx. My sample of firm-year observations available for 
propensity score matching is 5,247. The number of observations per year ranges from 
591 for 2006 to 801 for 2010 with an average of 750 firms. As detailed in Panel B in 
Table 1, I create a propensity-matched sample for RPE and non-RPE firms with data 
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available for investment efficiency variables. I also construct a second propensity-
matched sample for the firm performance analysis. My main samples for testing 
investment efficiency and firm performance consist of 1,812 firm-year observations and 
2,030 firm-year observations, respectively.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
I report descriptive statistics on RPE use in CEO compensation contracts in 
Table 2 for all firm-year observations with available data in Incentive Lab between 2006 
(on or after December 15th) and 2012. I classify a firm as using RPE in a given firm-year 
if they measure performance relative to the performance of a defined peer group or 
specific index to determine compensation amounts awarded to the CEO. Table 2, Panel 
A, indicates that 25.8% of the sample (2,106 out of 8,156 firm-years) explicitly contract 
on relative performance measures. In comparison, Bannister and Newman (2003) find 
that 28% of their sample of 160 firms disclose RPE use in compensation committee 
reports in 1992, and Gong et al. (2011) report that 25% of their 2006 sample use RPE. 
Therefore, the frequency of RPE use in my sample is consistent with prior studies. I also 
find that the percentage of firms using RPE generally increases over the sample period, 
in particular in 2010, 2011, and 2012.  
Table 2, Panels B, C, and D, provide additional descriptive data for RPE firms. 
The number of RPE metrics included in the compensation contract varies with 82.86% 
of RPE firms using only one relative performance metric and 12.58% of RPE firms 
using two relative performance metrics (Panel B, Table 2). In addition, most RPE firms 
use relative performance in equity-only awards over my sample period (1,364 of 2,106 
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observations or 64.8%). Panel C indicates that, of this equity-only subsample, RPE is 
used overwhelmingly for restricted stock (1,336 firms). I find that 58.4% of RPE firms 
use relative performance for equity in 2006, which is consistent with Gong et al. (2011) 
who report 59%. The frequency of RPE use in equity-only awards increases to 70.7% in 
2012. In contrast, the percentage of RPE firms using relative performance in cash-only 
awards decreases from 30.6% in 2006 to 18.9% in 2012. This trend, along with the 
increasing frequency of RPE use from Panel A, suggests that more firms are tying CEO 
compensation to relative performance measures in recent years while increasing CEO 
equity incentives. Finally, Panel D reports the types of peer groups used by firms to 
benchmark performance. Most RPE firms measure performance against a single custom 
group of firms or index. Many firms choose a self-selected, custom peer group (65.5%). 
Of the established indices, the most commonly used index is the S&P 500 (9.6%). I also 
find that 17.4% of RPE firms benchmark against other indices (17.4%), such as the S&P 
100, S&P 500 Property and Casualty index, or the NAREIT composite index. 
RPE firms benchmark relative performance using accounting- or market-based 
metrics. Table 3 summarizes the RPE measures disclosed in compensation plans. As 
shown in Panel A, TSR is used by 77.5% of all firm-year observations that incorporate 
RPE in CEO compensation plans followed by ROIC (7.9%) and EPS growth (6.7%).5 
The percentages in Panel A sum to slightly more than 100% because compensation plans 
                                                 
5 For performance metrics, Incentive Lab separately lists return on invested capital (ROIC) and return on 
investment (ROI). However, I combine both into a single classification, ROIC, based on the similar 
construction of the two measures described in proxy statements. 
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may include more than one RPE metric per year as reported in Table 2. Panel B of Table 
3 reports the combination of RPE performance metrics used by firm-years that contract 
on one or two RPE measures.6 This subsample accounts for over 95% of all firms 
employing RPE in my sample. When considering only firm-year observations using one 
or two RPE metrics, I find that 78% of the RPE firms in this subsample use TSR. ROIC 
and EPS growth follow in prevalence with RPE metrics at 6% and 5%, respectively. 
RPE firms contracting on TSR often select ROIC as their second measure if they use two 
more RPE metrics in the compensation contract. 
Table 4 provides summary statistics on performance, firm characteristics, and 
corporate governance variables used in the investment efficiency and firm performance 
analyses. The investment efficiency sample includes 907 RPE firm-years and 907 non-
RPE firm-years matched using the propensity-score model described in the following 
Research Design section and conditioned on data availability to construct variables 
required in the investment efficiency analysis. The mean (median) values for BMt-1 are 
for RPE and non-RPE observations are 0.656 (0.636) and 0.644 (0.638), respectively. In 
addition, the average ratio of PPE to total assets (TANGIBILITYt-1) and length of the 
operating cycle (OP_CYCLE t-1) are 0.305 and 4.665 for RPE firms, which is consistent 
with Biddle et al. (2009). Similarly, non-RPE firms have mean values of 0.315 and 4.660 
for TANGIBILITYt-1
 and OP_CYCLE t-1. Overall, RPE firms do not appear to have 
                                                 
6 The diagonal values in the table are the number of firms that use only the specified RPE metric. The 
totals at the bottom of the table are the sum of each column. 
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significantly different characteristics that affect investment efficiency compared to non-
RPE firms.  
I also report the summary statistics for variables used in the firm performance 
multivariate analysis, which includes 1,015 RPE firm-years and 1,015 non-RPE firm-
years matched using the propensity-score model and conditioned on data availability to 
construct variables required in the firm performance analysis. 75% of firm-year 
observations using RPE in this subsample contract on TSR performance, which is 
similar to the rate of the overall sample. In addition, 84% of the RPE firms measure 
relative performance over a period of three years or less (not shown in table). The mean 
(median) one-year TSR performance is 10.0% (8.0%) for RPE firms and 8.0% (8.2%) 
for non-RPE firms, which are not statistically different. In addition, RPE firms have 
marginally lower leverage (difference of 0.014, p-value < 0.10) and are older (difference 
of 1.674 years, p-value <0.10) compared to non-RPE firms. I control for these 
differences along with the other factors that can affect firm performance in multivariate 
tests (Tables 8 and 9). 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
To test whether RPE use affects investment efficiency and firm performance, I 
first employ a propensity score matching approach to create a matched sample of RPE 
(treatment) and non-RPE (control) firm-year observations based on several factors 
affecting the decision to incorporate RPE in CEO compensation contracts. Estimation of 
a causal effect in observational studies may be biased because firms choose 
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compensation methods endogenously. Consequently, differences in outcome may be 
attributed to factors that affect the likelihood of choosing a compensation method and 
not the actual method itself. Propensity score matching addresses sample selection bias 
by creating a matched sample of RPE and non-RPE firms based on their propensity to 
use RPE (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Dehejia and Wahba 2002).7  
For the propensity-score model, I estimate the probability of including RPE in 
CEO compensation contracts in a logistic regression based on a set of industry, firm, 
CEO, and corporate governance factors that affect the decision to incorporate RPE 
(Gong et al. 2011). I match RPE firm-year observations (treated) to non-RPE firm-year 
observations (control) without replacement based on closest propensity score match and 
a caliper width equal to 0.05, which is 20% of the standard deviation of the propensity 
                                                 
7 The results and inferences are similar when using the Heckman Inverse Mills Ratio method to address 
selection bias. 
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score.8 Because this matching approach depends on the order of the observations, I 
randomize the order prior to matching by propensity scores. 9 The model is as follows: 
Pr(RPEt = 1) = β0 + β1COMMON_RISKt-1 + β2SIZE_RKADJ t-1 + 
β3DIVERSITY_RKADJ t-1  
+ β4RETURN_RKADJ t-1 + β5INDUSTRY_CONCENTRATION t-1 + 
β6BM t-1  
+ β7MVE t-1 + β8ROA_INDADJ t-1 + β9RETURN_INDADJ t-1  
+ β10CEO_WEALTH t-1 + β11CEO_AGE t-1 + β12TOP5_INSTOWN t-1 
+ β13ACTIVIST_INSTOWN t-1 + β14CEO-CHAIR t-1 + β15BRD_INDEP t-1  
+ β16BRD_SIZE t-1 + β17COMPCONSULTANT t-1 + ε. (1) 
The dependent variable, RPE, is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-year 
observations that explicitly incorporate RPE in CEO compensation contracts in year t 
and 0 otherwise. The independent variables in Equation (1) are measured in the year t-1. 
To capture industry factors that may affect the choice to use RPE, I include variables for 
the amount of firm risk that can be attributed to common risk within a firm’s industry 
(COMMON_RISK), the availability of similar peers for the firm (SIZE_RKADJ, 
DIVERSITY_RKADJ, and RETURN_RKADJ), and market competitiveness 
(INDUSTRY_CONCENTRATION). Firm-level variables measure growth opportunities 
using book-to-market (BM), firm size using log of market value of equity (MVE), 
                                                 
8 I obtain similar results when matching with a tighter caliper of 0.01.  
9 I iterate the matching procedure 100 times to ensure that inferences are not sensitive to the order of the 
match. The matched samples are identical after resampling, and therefore I do not find evidence that the 
results from subsequent multivariate analyses are sensitive to matching. 
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industry-adjusted ROA (ROA_INDADJ), and industry-adjusted returns 
(RETURN_INDADJ). I measure CEO attributes using the value of the CEO equity 
holdings (CEO_WEALTH) and CEO age (CEO_AGE). Governance variables include 
institutional ownership concentration using the ratio of stock owned by the top five 
institutions over total institutional ownership for the firm (TOP5_INSTOWN), the ratio 
of stock owned by activist institutions over total institutional ownership for the firm 
(ACTIVIST_INSTOWN), CEO/Chairman of the Board duality (CEO-CHAIR), the 
percentage of independent directors serving on the board of directors (BRD_INDEP), 
and total number of directors on the board (BRD_SIZE).10 Finally, I include an indicator 
variable, COMPCONSULTANT, equal to 1 when the firm uses a compensation 
consultant to determine executive pay. The variables are further defined in Appendix B. 
The above model is estimated with fixed effects for year and industry.  
Table 5 compares the mean values of the selection variables in Equation (1) 
between RPE firms and non-RPE. Panel A reports the difference in means for the full 
cross-section of firms. After conditioning on the data availability for the independent 
variables in Equation (1), this sample consists of 3,260 non-RPE firm-year observations 
and 1,385 RPE firm-year observations. I find that, on average, non-RPE and RPE firms 
differ significantly on all measured dimensions with the exception of institutional 
ownership concentration (TOP5_INSTOWN). This suggests that interpreting causal 
effects without matching may be problematic because, on average, RPE and non-RPE 
                                                 
10 I follow Cremers and Nair (2005) in determining activist institutions. 
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firms differ substantially on the factors affecting RPE choice.11 Panel B compares 
selection determinants for the propensity-matched sample of non-RPE and RPE firms. 
The area under the ROC curve for the selection model is 0.82, which indicates a good 
model fit. To assess the covariate balance between the non-RPE and RPE groups after 
matching on the propensity score, I examine the difference in means across the two 
groups, as well as Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions for the 
continuous variables. The results in Panel B show that the means are not statistically 
different between the treatment and control groups for any variable. In addition, the 
distributions are similar for 12 of the 15 continuous variables at the 5% level. Overall, 
the tests of difference in means and distribution suggest that the propensity score 
matching procedure is successful in achieving covariate balance.12 
3.3.2 Deviation from Expected Investment Levels 
Having controlled for the choice to use RPE, I test whether RPE use affects 
investment decisions by examining the deviation from expected investment levels using 
an investment efficiency measure similar to Richardson (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009). 
The concept underlying the investment efficiency measure is that firms investing 
efficiently will undertake all positive NPV projects. To create my measure of investment 
efficiency, I first estimate the total investment per firm as a function of several factors 
                                                 
11 The differences in means between non-RPE and RPE firms for the determinants are consistent with the 
predictions and findings of Gong et al. (2011). 
12 The results for covariate balancing testing are similar for the other matched samples used in multivariate 
analysis. In addition, inclusion of the three variables that have statistically different distributions as 
controls in the main models do not change the inferences of the empirical tests. 
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that have been shown by prior research to affect firm-level investment decisions. The 
model is: 
INVESTMENTt = β0 + β1SALES_GROWTHt-1 + β2LEVERAGEt-1 + β3CASHt-1  
+ β4FIRM_AGEt-1 + β5MVEt-1 + β6INVESTMENTt-1 + ε. (2) 
Total investment, INVESTMENTt, is the sum of capital expenditures, 
acquisitions, and R&D, less the sale of property, plant, and equipment in the year of 
interest. The advantage of this definition of investment is that it includes several types of 
investments. For firm-level determinants of investment decisions, I include lagged 
measures of sales growth (SALES_GROWTHt-1), leverage (LEVERAGEt-1), level of cash 
(CASHt-1), firm age (FIRM_AGEt-1), and firm size (MVEt-1). Prior studies show that firm-
level investment decisions are sensitive to these measures (e.g., Lamont 1997; Hubbard 
1998; Lamont 2000; Bates 2005). I also include the total investment from the prior year 
(INVESTMENTt-1) because the firm’s decision to invest in the current year may 
dependent on its previous investment. These variables are defined in Appendix B. 
I estimate Equation (2) for each industry-year (2-digit SIC) with at least 15 
observations. The residual from the estimation model is the firm’s deviation from 
expected investment. Therefore, firms with large positive residuals are likely to be 
overinvesting whereas those with large negative residuals are likely to be 
underinvesting. I classify firms into quartiles each year based on the magnitude of the 
residuals: (1) observations in the highest quartile are considered overinvesting firms; (2) 
observations in the lowest quartile are considered underinvesting firms; and (3) 
 28 
 
observations in the middle quartiles are the benchmark group. To examine the effect of 
RPE use on investment efficiency, I test the likelihood that a firm will over- or 
underinvest using a multinomial logistic model: 
INV_EFFt = β0 + β1RPEt + β2ASSETSt-1 + β3BMt-1 + β4TANGIBILITYt-1 
+ β5CASH_FLOWt-1 + β6SLACKt-1 + β7OP_CYCLEt-1 + β8LOSSt-1  
+ β9DIVIDENDSt-1 + β10σCASH_FLOWt-1 + β11σSALESt-1 + 
β12σINVESTMENTt-1 + β13BRD_SIZEt + β14BRD_INDEPt + β15CEO-
CHAIRt + β16INSTOWNt  
+ β17ANALYSTSt + ε. (3) 
The dependent variable, INV_EFFt, is equal to 0 for the benchmark group, 1 for the 
firms investing below the expected levels, and 2 for the firms investing above the 
expected levels. RPE is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the firm-year observation 
reports a RPE component in its CEO compensation plan for year t, and 0 otherwise. I 
also include a set of control variables for corporate governance, business cycle, and 
operating volatility following Biddle et al. (2009).  
3.3.3 Empirical Specification for Firm Performance 
To investigate the effect of RPE use on firm performance, I estimate the 
following regression of firm performance as a function of RPE use (RPE) and control 
variables using the propensity-matched samples constructed from the propensity-score 
model specified in Equation (1):  
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FIRM_PERFORMANCEt = β0 + β1RPEt + β2BRD_SIZEt + β3BRD_INDEPt  
+ β4LEVERAGEt + β5FIRM_AGEt + β6MVEt + 
β7FIRM_PERFORMANCEt-1 + β8IOSt + ε. (4) 
I measure firm performance as total stockholder return (TSR) because it is the most 
commonly contracted RPE metric. TSR is a tangible measure of value provided to 
investors and is a direct evaluation of interest alignment between managers and 
shareholders. In addition, the calculation of TSR performance is more standardized 
across firms than other relative performance measures, such as return on invested 
capital. Consistent with formulas disclosed in proxy statements, I calculate TSR as the 
change in stock price (ending share price minus beginning share price) plus aggregate 
dividend payments over the performance period divided by the stock price at the 
beginning of the performance period.  
Consistent with the previous equations, RPE is an indicator variable equal to 1 
when the firm-year observation explicitly reports an RPE component in its CEO 
compensation plan for year t, and 0 otherwise. I also control for board and firm 
characteristics that may affect firm performance. Board of director variables include 
board size (BRD_SIZE) and board independence (BRD_INDEP). For firm 
characteristics, I include leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) calculated as total debt divided by 
total assets, firm age (FIRM_AGE), the log of market value of equity (MVE) for firm 
size, 1-year lagged TSR performance, and investment opportunity set (IOS). I follow the 
methodology in Baber et al. (1996) in defining IOS as a broad construct that measures a 
firm’s ability to successfully pursue different growth options. This measure of IOS 
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considers growth opportunities stemming from research and development activities, 
discretionary expenditures in acquisitions, capacity expansions, restructuring of existing 
assets, and product branding through advertising. Finally, I estimate Equation (2) with 
fixed effects for year and industry to account for heterogeneity across time and industry 
and adjust standard errors by clustering on firm. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
I estimate Equation (4) on three propensity-matched samples. First, I use the full 
matched sample of non-RPE and RPE firms to estimate the average effect of RPE use on 
firm performance regardless of which measures are included in the compensation 
contract. I then re-estimate Equation (2) using a subsample of RPE firms that 
specifically contract on relative TSR and non-RPE firms to test Hypothesis 2b. Lastly, I 
use a subsample of RPE firms contracting on TSR and non-RPE firms using TSR as an 
absolute performance measure in order to hold the performance metric constant and vary 
the benchmarking approach. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 RPE Use and Investment Efficiency 
To test my first hypothesis, I examine the likelihood of a firm deviating from 
expected investment as a function of RPE use. Table 6, Panel A, presents the 
multinomial logistic regression results on investment efficiency from the model 
specified in Equation (3). I examine underinvestment in Column 1 and overinvestment in 
Column 2. In Column 1, I find a negative and significant coefficient for RPE (-0.408, 
p-value < 0.01). This suggests that RPE firms are generally less likely to invest sub-
optimally than non-RPE firms. In addition, the likelihood of underinvestment decreases 
with higher book-to-market and tangibility in year t-1. In terms of economic 
significance, the probability of underinvesting is 2.3 percentage points lower for RPE 
firms compared to non-RPE first, holding all continuous variables at means and indicator 
variables at median values. In comparison, the probability of underinvesting is 4.2 
percentage points lower when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentiles in 
TANGIBILITYt-1, holding all continuous variables at means, indicator variables at 
median values , and RPE = 1. For book-to-market, the probability of underinvesting is 
14.2 percentage points lower when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentiles, holding 
all continuous variables at means, indicator variables at median values, and RPE = 1. 
I also find that on average RPE firms are less likely to overinvest as indicated by 
the negative and significant coefficient for RPE (-0.408, p-value < 0.01) in Column 2. 
Firms with longer operating cycles or incurred a loss in the previous year also are less 
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likely to overinvest. The probability of overinvesting is 1.6 percentage points lower for 
RPE firms compared to non-RPE first, holding all continuous variables at means and 
indicator variables at median values. In comparison, the probability of overinvesting is 
6.7 percentage points lower when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentiles in 
OP_CYCLEt-1, holding all continuous variables at means, indicator variables at median 
values, and RPE = 1. Similarly, I find that the probability of overinvesting is 1.6 
percentage points lower when firm-year observations incur a loss in the previous year, 
holding all continuous variables at means, indicator variables at median values, and RPE 
= 1. The economic significance results suggest that while other firm characteristics have 
a significant effect on investment efficiency, RPE can still be used to move managers 
towards optimal investment levels.13 This is consistent with the idea that RPE use in 
compensation plans strengthens the interest alignment between the interests of managers 
and shareholders. 
4.1.1 Peer Group Common Risk and Investment Efficiency 
Principal-agent theory suggests that RPE should improve the evaluation of 
managers’ actions by removing common exogenous shocks that are beyond the 
managers’ control, resulting in more efficient contracting and better incentive alignment. 
In theory, RPE is more effective in motivating managers when peer performance 
provides more information about managers’ actions than firm performance alone 
(Holmstrom 1979, 1982; Baiman and Demski 1980). Consistent with this concept, 
                                                 
13 I find similar results for economic significance when holding all other variables to median values. 
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Frederickson (1992) demonstrates experimentally that study participants increase effort 
as common risk increases under an RPE contract, but not under a non-RPE (i.e. absolute 
performance benchmark) contract. Therefore, I test whether the positive effect of RPE 
on investment efficiency is dependent on the extent of common risk by examining the 
relation between RPE use and deviation from expected investment levels conditional on 
the amount of common risk captured by the custom peer group.  
For this set of analyses, I identify RPE firms that specify a custom peer group 
and match them to non-RPE firms using the propensity-score model in Equation (1). The 
propensity-matched sample consists of 1,212 firm-year observations. I measure the 
amount of common risk captured by the peer group, PEER_COMMONRISK, using the 
R-squared from a regression of the firm’s stock returns over the prior 36 months on the 
average returns of the peer group. PEER_COMMONRISK is set to zero for non-RPE 
firms because no common risk is filtered out for firm performance.14 In my sample of 
RPE firms that use custom peer groups, I find that the extent to which peer firms capture 
common risk in the RPE firm varies significantly. In untabulated summary statistics, I 
find that PEER_COMMONRISK ranges from 0.014 to 0.865 with a mean of 0.513 and a 
median of 0.545. I also control for the degree of similarity between the peer firms and 
RPE firm because tournament theory predicts that selecting peers with lower ability may 
reduce RPE benefits (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Hvide 2002). I define 
                                                 
14 In unreported analysis, I also use two alternative proxies for common risk captured by the selected peer 
group: (1) the correlation between the firm’s stock returns over the prior 36 months and the average 
returns of the peer group, and (2) the coefficient from a regression of the firm’s stock returns over the prior 
36 months on the average returns of the peer group. The subsequent results and conclusions are similar 
using the alternative proxies. 
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PEER_DISSIMILARITY as the absolute difference between the firm’s market 
capitalization and the average for the peer group in year t-1; as constructed, 
PEER_DISSIMILARITY increases as firms become less similar in ability. 
PEER_DISSIMILARITY is set to zero for non-RPE firms. In untabulated summary 
statistics, I find that PEER_ DISSIMILARITY ranges from 0.056 to 138.301 with a mean 
of 10.557 and a median of 3.837. 
Table 6, Panel B, reports the regression results for the likelihood of over or 
underinvesting for the subset of RPE firms that use custom peer groups and the control 
firms. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the multinomial logistic regression of 
investment efficiency as a function of common risk captured by the selected peers. I find 
that the coefficient for PEER_COMMONRISK is negative and significant for the 
likelihood of underinvesting (-1.284, p-value < 0.01) and the likelihood of overinvesting 
(-0.922, p-value < 0.01). The coefficient for PEER_DISSIMILARITY is not significant 
for either underinvestment or overinvestment, however. 
I also re-estimate the investment efficiency as a function of the indicator of RPE 
use (RPE) for this subsample (Columns (3) and (4)). The coefficients for RPE remain 
negative and significant for both the likelihood of underinvestment and overinvestment, 
which is consistent with the idea that RPE use moves managers to higher investment 
efficiency. To understand whether the common risk captured by selected peers affects 
investment efficiency beyond the use of RPE in compensation plans, I compare Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) of the two 
specifications, and find that the model using the RPE indicator has smaller AIC and BIC 
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values than the larger model incorporating common risk and peer dissimilarity variables. 
Therefore the addition of peer-based variables does not improve on the model 
specification, which suggests that higher investment efficiency is mainly driven by the 
use of RPE and not necessarily a function of common risk captured by peers.   
4.1.2 Evaluating the Investment Efficiency Measure 
 To determine whether the measure of investment efficiency using the deviation 
from expected investment levels by industry-year captures the construct of investment 
efficiency, I estimate the relation between this proxy and future firm performance using 
firms from my 2006-2012 sample that have data available to construct the investment 
efficiency and lead performance variables. Conceptually, investing efficiently should 
lead to higher future profitability and operating performance compared to over- or 
under-investing because firms that invest efficiently undertake all projects with positive 
NPV instead of passing on investment opportunities with positive NPV (under-
investing) or investing in projects with negative NPV (over-investing). I measure 
investment efficiency in year t and examine changes in firm performance over two and 
three year periods beginning in year t-1 using three proxies – return on assets (ROA) 
growth, earnings per share (EPS) growth, and change in Tobin’s Q. For ROA growth, I 
define ROAGROWTH_2YR (ROAGROWTH_3YR) as the change in ROA between year 
t+1 (t+2) and year t-1 divided by the absolute value of ROA in year t-1. Similarly, I 
define EPSGROWTH_2YR (EPSGROWTH_3YR) for EPS growth as the change in EPS 
between year t+1 (t+2) and year t-1 divided by the absolute value of EPS in year t-1. 
Finally, I measure the change in firm value using ΔTOBIN_2YR (ΔTOBIN_3YR), which 
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is calculated as the as the change in Tobin’s Q between the end of year t+1 (t+2) and 
beginning of year t divided by Tobin’s Q at the beginning of year t.  
 Table 6, Panel C, presents the univariate results. I find that firms classified as 
investing efficiently tend to have higher 2-year EPS growth and higher increase in 
Tobin’s Q than those that are classified as underinvesting over 2-year and 3-year 
periods. In addition, firms that invest efficiently also have higher 2-year and 3-year ROA 
growth, higher EPS growth, and higher increase in Tobin’s Q than firms that are 
classified as overinvesting. Together, the results suggest that efficient investing is 
associated with higher future profitability and operating performance. 
4.2 RPE Use and Firm Performance 
 In my next analysis, I investigate whether the benefits of RPE use are reflected in 
overall firm performance. Table 7 presents the regression results for firm performance as 
defined by the most frequently used RPE metric, TSR, for propensity-matched RPE/non-
RPE samples. In Panel A, I compare the effect of RPE on one- and two-year TSR using 
the full matched sample of RPE and non-RPE firms. The coefficient on RPE is not 
statistically significant for either one- or two-year TSR. This result suggests that RPE 
firms do not generally have higher TSR than non-RPE firms. Panel B presents regression 
results examining whether performance differs across RPE and non-RPE firms that 
specifically contract on TSR. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, I find that these RPE firms 
have higher 1-year TSR performance than non-RPE firms as indicated by the positive 
and significant coefficient for RPE (0.037, p-value < 0.05). However, this positive effect 
of RPE on performance does not hold for 2-year TSR performance. Finally, Panel C 
 37 
 
reports the regression results for the sample of RPE that contract on TSR and non-RPE 
firms that contract on TSR as an absolute benchmark. I find that the coefficient for RPE 
is positive and statistically significant for both 1-year TSR and 2-year TSR estimations.15  
Based on the results from Table 7, I cannot reject the null in Hypothesis 2a and 
find that RPE firms do not generally demonstrate higher performance than non-RPE 
firms. I find some evidence that RPE firms have higher performance than non-RPE firms 
when contracting on the tested performance metric. Hence, although my earlier results 
indicate that RPE improves investment efficiency, this positive implication does not 
appear to translate clearly into higher firm performance. One possible explanation is that 
I am unable to empirically detect the benefits of RPE in the overall sample.  
4.2.1 Peer Group Common Risk and Firm Performance 
I further investigate the effect of explicit RPE use in compensation plans on firm 
performance when the common risk captured by peer selection is high because RPE 
benefits should increase with common risk, as shown in the investment efficiency results 
in Table 7. Table 8 reports the regression results for TSR performance as a function of 
peer selection. The coefficient for PEER_COMMONRISK is positive and significant for 
both one- and two-year TSR (0.067, p-value < 0.05; 0.342, p-value < 0.05), which 
indicates that RPE firms selecting peers that capture more common risk demonstrate 
higher TSR performance on average. With respect to similarity in firm ability, I find a 
negative and significant coefficient for PEER_DISSIMILARITY for one-year TSR 
                                                 
15 In untabulated results, I find that RPE firms contracting on a measure other than TSR do not have higher 
TSR than non-RPE firms. 
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performance, but not for two-year TSR performance.16 In untabulated analysis, I re-
estimate firm performance as a function of RPE use (RPE_USE) for this subsample. The 
coefficient for RPE_USE is not significant in either 1-year or 2-year TSR performance 
estimations, which is consistent with the results in Table 7. I also compare the model 
using the RPE indicator to the model incorporating the common risk captured by 
selected peers (PEER_COMMONRISK) and peer dissimilarity 
(PEER_DISSIMILARITY), and find that the second model has smaller AIC and BIC 
values. This suggests that the specification using peer information is a better fit for the 
data. Overall, I find evidence consistent with principal-agent theory that predicts that the 
risk-sharing benefit of RPE increases with more common risk between firm and peers. 
4.3 Additional Analysis 
4.3.1 RPE Adoption 
 As an alternative method to address causality, I further refine the analysis of the 
effect of RPE use on firm performance by examining firm performance around RPE 
adoption for firms that begin using RPE in compensation plans. I classify firms as RPE 
adopters only when they explicitly use RPE in two or more consecutive years upon 
adoption. This requirement greatly reduces the available sample; after requiring three 
                                                 
16 The findings are similar when I include CEO wealth, vega, and delta variables in the multivariate 
analysis. 
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years of post-adoption performance data, my sample is 168 firm-year observations. I use 
TSR to proxy for firm performance and focus on RPE firms that contract on TSR.  
 Table 9 reports the results for TSR performance around RPE adoption for RPE 
contracting on TSR and non-RPE firms. I measure the annual TSR performance in each 
time period: year before adoption (t-1), first year of adoption (t), second year of adoption 
(t+1), third year of adoption (t+2). I summarize the adoption timeline in Panel A. The 
bar graph in Panel B compares the annual TSR performance for RPE and non-RPE 
observations over time. I include the p-value for the difference in means as well as 
standard error bars to indicate whether the two groups’ averages are statistically 
different. I find that TSR performance is not statistically different between RPE adopters 
and non-RPE firms in the year before adoption. In addition, there is no difference 
between the two groups in the first and second year of adoption. In contrast, RPE firms 
on average demonstrate higher TSR performance in the third year of adoption, which 
suggests that RPE use is associated with higher firm performance after RPE adoption, 
but the effect is not immediate. 
  
 40 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
I investigate whether firms incorporating RPE in compensation contracts 
demonstrate higher investment efficiency and firm performance consistent with better 
incentive alignment than similar firms that do not use RPE. My study is motivated by 
principal-agent theory that suggests that the optimal incentive scheme is to compensate 
managers on the performance of his/her firm relative to that of peer firms when 
managers are risk-averse and firm performance is affected by common exogenous 
shocks.  
After matching on determinants of RPE use to address selection bias concerns, 
my results for RPE use and investment efficiency suggest that RPE firms are generally 
less likely to over- or underinvest, which is consistent with the idea that RPE use 
motivates managers to make optimal decisions. I also find that the improvement in 
investment efficiency over non-RPE firms is primarily driven by the use of RPE in 
compensation contracts and not necessarily a function of common risk captured by 
selected peers for RPE firms that use custom peer groups. However, I do not find strong 
evidence that RPE firms have higher firm performance than similar non-RPE firms in 
the overall sample; RPE firms on average have higher TSR than non-RPE firms only 
when they contract on TSR performance. Consistent with principal-agent theory, which 
predicts that RPE benefits depend on the extent of common risk, I find that RPE firms 
have higher TSR performance than non-RPE firms when common risk is higher for firm 
and peer performance. RPE firms using a custom peer group perform better than non-
RPE firms when the selected peer firms capture more common risk. In sensitivity tests, I 
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show that RPE use is associated with higher firm performance after RPE adoption, but 
the effect is not immediate. Together, these results provide some evidence that RPE use 
in compensation contracts reduces agency costs and improves incentive alignment. 
My main results are important because they provide the first empirical evidence that 
RPE use affects managerial behavior. With the exception of Gong et al. (2011) and 
Bettis et al. (2014), which use the new disclosures to examine the determinants of RPE 
use, prior RPE studies focus on whether RPE is used in compensation contracts through 
implicit tests because firms were not required to disclose the information prior to 2006. 
My findings link the predicted benefits of RPE from principal-agent theory to outcomes 
from RPE use as practiced by examining the explicit use of RPE as disclosed by firms to 
investment choices and firm performance. I also document the effect of common risk on 
managers’ actions and find some evidence that RPE is more effective in motivating 
managers when peer performance provides more information about managers’ actions 
than firm performance alone, consistent with theoretical predictions (Holmstrom 1979, 
1982; Baiman and Demski 1980) and experimental studies (Frederickson 1992). Future 
empirical studies on RPE can investigate the effect of RPE use on other managerial 
decisions or the effect of peer group characteristics on managerial incentives. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXAMPLES OF RPE DISCLOSURES 
The following excerpts are taken from the CD&A of proxy statements filed after 
the 2006 SEC disclosure changes. These illustrate the different ways that RPE can be 
implemented.  
Hess Corporation (2012) 
In 2012 the compensation and management development committee made significant 
changes to the company’s long-term incentive program for the company’s officers, including 
the NEOs, to bolster the link between pay and performance. In March 2012, the committee 
changed the long-term incentive award program so that 50% of the shares awarded annually 
will be performance share units and the remaining 50% will be in the form of restricted 
stock, with stock option awards being eliminated. Payouts on performance share awards will 
be determined based on the relative performance of the company’s TSR over a three-year 
performance period ending December 31, 2014 compared with that of fifteen peer 
companies specified in the 2012 Comparator Group on page 21. Payouts of the 2012 
performance share awards will range from 0 to 200% of the target award based on the 
company’s TSR ranking within the peer group as shown below: 
 
However, in the event that the company’s TSR for the performance period is 
negative, payout for such period will not exceed 100% of target. In the event the 
number of peer companies in the peer group including the company is reduced 
during the performance period by reason of merger, sale, dissolution, bankruptcy or 
similar circumstances, to 15, 14 or 13, payouts will be made in accordance with 
alternate payout schedules, and if such number is reduced to fewer than 13, the 
compensation and development committee will recalibrate the payouts 
commensurate with the reduced number. To the extent earned, performance shares 
will be paid in shares of Hess common stock which will vest and be issued following 
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the end of the performance period. Dividend equivalents for the performance period 
will accrue on performance shares and will only be paid out on earned shares after 
the performance period. In making these changes to the long-term incentive program, 
the committee was mindful of the preference of some of the company’s stockholders 
that delivery of long-term incentive compensation be linked in part to attainment of 
an objective performance metric, and it believes these changes will further reinforce 
the linkage of the interests of the company’s executives with those of the 
stockholders. 
 
Applied Materials (2012) 
Annual Adjusted Operating Profit Margin Goal. In order for the NEO’s fiscal 2012 
equity awards to become eligible for time-based vesting, Applied must achieve: (1) 
positive annual adjusted operating profit margin in any one of fiscal years 2012, 
2013, 2014 or 2015, and (2) targeted levels of relative annual adjusted operating 
profit margin for that same year. We believe these goals are appropriate in light of 
the cyclical nature of the industries in which we operate. For purposes of calculating 
fiscal 2012 annual adjusted operating profit margin, the Committee excluded certain 
charges such as items associated with goodwill impairments and restructuring and 
asset impairment charges. Assuming the performance goals are met, the NEO must 
also remain an employee for four years from the grant date in order for all of the 
shares to vest. 
The number of shares eligible to vest (or earned) is determined based upon relative 
annual adjusted operating profit margin, with no shares eligible to vest unless 
Applied’s annual adjusted operating profit margin is positive and achieves a rank 
within the peer group of at least the 40th percentile. 
 
 
Total Shareholder Return Goal.    In order to focus the NEOs even more intently on 
creating long-term stockholder value, for the fiscal 2012 performance-based equity 
awards, the Committee included an additional incentive tied to targeted levels of 
TSR relative to a peer group comprised of companies in the S&P 500 IT Index. The 
TSR goal requires, as a threshold, that Applied’s annual adjusted operating profit 
margin is positive and achieves a rank within the peer group of at least the 40th 
percentile. In this way, if additional shares become eligible to vest under the TSR 
goal, NEOs will be rewarded not only for achieving strong operating results, but also 
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for creating meaningful additional stockholder value. If annual adjusted operating 
profit margin goals are achieved and Applied’s relative TSR for the two-year period 
ending on the last day of fiscal 2013 is at least the 60th percentile of the S&P 500 IT 
Index, then additional shares will become eligible for time-based vesting, expressed 
as a percentage of the number of shares earned under the annual adjusted operating 
profit margin goal, as set forth below. 
 
Depending on the level of achievement of both the relative operating profit margin and 
TSR goals, the number of shares that may become eligible to vest under the time-based 
schedule ranges from 0% to 150% of the target number. In order for the maximum 
number of shares to become eligible to vest, annual adjusted operating profit margin 
must be at the 65th percentile or higher within the applicable peer group, and TSR must 
be at the 75th percentile or higher within the S&P 500 IT Index. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition 
ACTIVIST_INSTOWN Ratio of stock owned by activist institutions over total 
institutional ownership for the firm as defined by 
Cremers and Nair (2005). 
ANALYSTS Number of analysts following the firm. 
ASSETS Log of total assets 
BM Total assets divided by the sum of the market value of 
equity and total liabilities. 
BRD_INDEP Percentage of independent directors serving on the board 
of directors. 
BRD_SIZE Total number of directors on the board 
CASH Cash and scaled by total assets. 
CASH_FLOW Cash flow from operations divided by sales. 
CEO-CHAIR Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the 
Chairman of the Board, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO_AGE Age of the CEO. 
CEO_WEALTH Log of the equity value (stock and options) held by the 
CEO. 
COMMON_RISK R-squared from regressing the firm’s buy-and-hold 
returns on value-weighted industry return (2-digit SIC) 
over the 36 month period before the beginning of year t. 
COMPCONSULTANT Indicator variable equal to 1 when the firm uses a 
compensation consultant to determine executive pay, and 
0 otherwise. 
DIVIDENDS Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm pays dividends 
during the year, and 0 otherwise. 
DIVERSITY_RKADJ Log of the absolute difference in firm’s segment 
concentration and the median segment concentration for 
the firm’s corresponding decile. Deciles are constructed 
using firms within the same 2-digit industry based on 
segment concentration, which is the sum of squares of 
each segment’s sale divided by total segment sales. 
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Variable Definition 
EPSGROWTH_2YR EPS growth over 2 years. This is calculated as the 
change in EPS between year t+1 and year t-1 divided by 
the absolute value of EPS in year t-1. 
EPSGROWTH_3YR EPS growth over 3 years. This is calculated as the 
change in EPS between year t+2 and year t-1 divided by 
the absolute value of EPS in year t-1. 
FIRM_AGE Number of years since firm first appeared in Compustat 
with valid assets. 
INDUSTRY_CONCENTRATION Sum of squares of firms’ market share of sales within 
each 2-digit SIC industry. 
INSTOWN Percentage of firm’s stock owned by institutional 
owners. 
INV_EFF Equal to 0 for the benchmark group, 1 for the firms 
investing below the expected levels, and 2 for the firms 
investing above the expected levels. Classification is 
based on the residuals from estimating Equation (2). 
INVESTMENT Sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, and R&D, less 
the sale of property, plant, and equipment 
IOS Investment opportunity set scores calculated using factor 
analysis (Baber et al. 1996). 
LEVERAGE Sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total 
assets. 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to 1 if net income before 
extraordinary items less than zero, and 0 otherwise. 
MVE Log of market value of equity (common stock 
outstanding × closing stock price at end of fiscal year).  
OP_CYCLE Log of receivables/sale plus inventory/cost of goods sold 
multiplied by 360. 
OVERINVESTING Indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm-year is 
classified as overinvesting, and 0 is classified as 
investing efficiently. 
PEER_COMMONRISK Common risk captured by selected peer group. This is 
measured as the R-squared from a regression of the 
firm’s stock returns over the prior 36 months on the 
average returns of the peer group. 
PEER_DISSIMILARITY Dissimilarity in ability between the firm and the peer 
group. This is calculated as the absolute value of the 
firm’s market capitalization less the average of the peer 
group in year t-1.  
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Variable Definition 
RETURN_INDADJ Buy-and-hold annual stock returns less the median buy-
and-hold annual stock returns for the same 2-digit 
industry. 
RETURN_RKADJ Absolute difference in firm’s annual stock returns and 
the median annual stock returns for the firm’s 
corresponding decile. Deciles are constructed using 
firms within the same 2-digit industry based on annual 
stock returns.  
ROA_INDADJ Return on assets less the median return on assets for the 
same 2-digit industry.  
ROAGROWTH_2YR ROA growth over 2 years. This is calculated as the 
change in ROA between year t+1 and year t-1 divided by 
the absolute value of ROA in year t-1. 
ROAGROWTH_3YR ROA growth over 3 years. This is calculated as the 
change in ROA between year t+2 and year t-1 divided by 
the absolute value of ROA in year t-1. 
RPE Indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm-year explicitly 
uses RPE, and 0 otherwise. 
RPE_TSR Indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm-year explicitly 
uses RPE and contracts on TSR, and 0 otherwise.  
SALES_GROWTH Percentage change in sales over one year. 
SIZE_RKADJ Log of the absolute difference in firm’s market value of 
equity and the median market value of equity for the 
firm’s corresponding decile. Deciles are constructed 
using firms within the same 2-digit industry based on 
market value of equity. 
SLACK Cash divided by property, plant and equipment 
TANGIBILITY Property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. 
TOP5_INSTOWN Ratio of stock owned by the top five institutions over 
total institutional ownership for the firm. 
ΔTOBIN_2YR Percentage change in Tobin’s Q over 2 years. This is 
calculated as the change in Tobin’s Q between the end of 
year t+1 and beginning of year t divided by Tobin’s Q at 
the beginning of year t 
ΔTOBIN_3YR Percentage change in Tobin’s Q over 2 years. This is 
calculated as the change in Tobin’s Q between the end of 
year t+2 and beginning of year t divided by Tobin’s Q at 
the beginning of year t 
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Variable Definition 
TSR_1YR Total shareholder return over one year. This is calculated 
as the ending share price minus beginning share price 
plus aggregate dividend payments over the performance 
period divided by the stock price at the beginning of the 
performance period. 
TSR_1YRt-1 Annual TSR for year t-1. 
TSR_2YR Total shareholder return over two years. This is 
calculated as the ending share price minus beginning 
share price plus aggregate dividend payments over the 
performance period divided by the stock price at the 
beginning of the performance period. 
TSR_3YR Total shareholder return over three years. This is 
calculated as the ending share price minus beginning 
share price plus aggregate dividend payments over the 
performance period divided by the stock price at the 
beginning of the performance period. 
UNDERINVESTING Indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm-year is 
classified as underinvesting, and 0 is classified as 
investing efficiently. 
σCASH_FLOW Standard deviation of cash flow from operations scaled 
by average total assets for years t-5 to t-1. 
σINVESTMENT Standard deviation of total investment years t-5 to t-1. 
σSALES Standard deviation of sales scaled by average total assets 
for years t-5 to t-1. 
 
 
  
 55 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
TABLES 
TABLE 1 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
Panel A: Sample for propensity-score matching  
 Firm-Year Observations 
Firms in Incentive Lab with CEO compensation contract data for 2006-2012  8,493 
Less firms with fiscal years ending before new disclosure rules (12/15/2006)  (337) 
Less firms missing data for variables required in propensity-score model  (2,909) 
Sample of firms available for propensity score matching  5,247 
 
Panel B: Main samples for investment efficiency and firm performance tests 
 Firm-Year Observations 
Sample of firms available for propensity score matching  5,247 
Less firms missing investment efficiency variables  (1,203) 
Less firms not matched in propensity score model  (2,230) 
Propensity-matched sample for investment efficiency analysis  1,814 
  
Sample of firms available for propensity score matching  5,247 
Less firms missing performance data  (732) 
Less firms not matched in propensity score model  (2,485) 
Full propensity-matched sample for firm performance analysis  2,030 
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TABLE 2 
RPE USE IN CEO COMPENSATION CONTRACTS 
Panel A: Use of RPE in CEO compensation contracts per year 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL 
Non-RPE 747 78.1% 1,003 79.3% 951 78.5% 930 77.1% 879 73.2% 827 69.6% 714 63.4% 6,050 74.2% 
RPE 209 21.9% 262 20.7% 261 21.5% 277 22.9% 322 26.8% 361 30.4% 413 36.6% 2,106 25.8% 
Total 956  1,265  1,212  1,207  1,201  1,188  1,127  8,156  
 
Panel B: Number of RPE metrics 
NUMBER OF RPE METRICS NUMBER OF FIRMS PERCENTAGE 
1 1,745 82.86% 
2 265 12.58% 
3 81 3.85% 
4 12 0.57% 
5 3 0.14% 
 
Panel C: RPE use by award type per year 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL 
Restricted stock 118 56.5% 143 54.6% 162 62.1% 167 60.1% 208 64.6% 249 69.0% 289 70.0% 1,336 63.4% 
Stock options 2 1.0% 3 1.1% 2 0.8% 2 0.7% 2 0.6% 2 0.6% 1 0.2% 14 0.7% 
RSU & options     2   1.0%     1   0.4%     1   0.4%     3   1.1%     2   0.6%     3     0.8%     2   0.5%     14   0.7% 
Equity Subtotal 122 58.4% 147 56.1% 165 63.2% 172 61.9% 212 65.8% 254 70.4% 292 70.7% 1,364 64.8% 
                 
Cash only 64 30.6% 78 29.8% 63 24.1% 73 26.3% 74 23.0% 73 20.2% 78 18.9% 503 23.9% 
                 
Cash & equity 23 11.0% 37 14.1% 33 12.6% 33 11.9% 36 11.2% 34 9.4% 43 10.4% 239 11.3% 
 
Panel D: Type of peer group used for RPE 
PEER GROUP TYPE NUMBER OF FIRMS PERCENTAGE 
Custom peer group 1,380 65.53% 
Other index (e.g. S&P 100, S&P 500 Property & Casualty index, NAREIT composite index) 366 17.38% 
S&P 500 193 9.16% 
Custom peer group & other index 79 3.67% 
Custom peer group & S&P 500 43 2.04% 
S&P 500 & other index 33 1.57% 
Custom peer group, S&P 500 & other index 12 0.57% 
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TABLE 3 
RPE METRICS FOR COMPENSATION CONTRACTS 
Panel A: Five most common RPE metrics 
METRIC NUMBER OF FIRMS PERCENTAGE 
Total shareholder return 1,631 77.45% 
ROIC 166 7.88% 
EPS growth 142 6.74% 
Sales growth 116 5.51% 
ROE 95 4.51% 
 
Panel B: Performance metrics for firms-year observations using one or two metrics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) TSR 1,419 52 11 13 15 2 5 11 9 6 2 30 
(2) ROIC 52 50 2 0 7 0 0 3 2 1 1 3 
(3) EPS growth 11 2 47 20 13 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 
(4) ROE 13 0 20 29 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 7 
(5) Sales growth 15 7 13 0 30 3 0 6 1 0 0 3 
(6) Profit margin 2 0 0 0 3 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(7) ROA 5 0 0 1 0 0 14 1 6 0 0 11 
(8) EPS / earnings 11 3 0 2 6 0 1 12 0 0 1 3 
(9) Operating income 9 2 0 0 1 0 6 0 12 0 3 0 
(10) Operating income growth 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 0 
(11) Sales 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 9 0 
(12) Other metric 30 3 7 7 3 0 11 3 0 0 0 98 
              
 TOTAL 1,575 121 101 72 78 20 38 39 33 18 18 162 
Percentages in Panel A sum to more than 100% because compensation plans may include more than one RPE component per year.  
In Panel B, the values on the diagonal (in bold) are the number of firm-year observations that use one RPE metric. 
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TABLE 4 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Panel A: Summary statistics for RPE firms 
 MEAN SD MIN P25 MEDIAN P75 MAX 
Variables for investment efficiency analysis (N = 907) 
ASSETSt-1 8.868 1.315 6.156 7.950 8.746 9.821 12.104 
BMt-1 0.656 0.247 0.158 0.469 0.636 0.845 1.230 
TANGIBILITYt-1 0.305 0.221 0.017 0.130 0.240 0.442 0.872 
CASH_FLOWt-1 0.171 0.133 -0.044 0.086 0.138 0.228 0.660 
SLACKt-1 1.194 2.588 0.001 0.105 0.364 0.919 16.845 
OP_CYCLEt-1 4.665 0.611 2.790 4.360 4.737 5.006 6.208 
LOSSt-1 0.121 0.327 0 0 0 0 1 
DIVIDENDSt-1 0.700 0.458 0 0 1 1 1 
σCASH_FLOW 0.026 0.023 0.002 0.011 0.019 0.034 0.118 
σSALES 0.093 0.086 0.005 0.035 0.067 0.119 0.481 
σINVESTMENT 399.677 733.046 4.229 43.783 136.249 378.579 4,811.587 
BRD_SIZE 10.303 1.959 6 9 10 12 16 
BRD_INDEP 0.841 0.086 0.556 0.800 0.875 0.900 0.929 
CEO-CHAIR 0.605 0.489 0 0 1 1 1 
INSTOWN 0.684 0.293 0.000 0.656 0.785 0.875 0.993 
ANALYSTS 13.216 7.881 0 8 12 18 34 
Variables for firm performance analysis (N = 1,015) 
RPE_TSR 0.750 0.433 0 1 1 1 1 
TSR_1YR 0.100 0.411 -0.775 -0.140 0.082 0.275 1.772 
TSR_2YR 0.202 0.609 -0.846 -0.175 0.106 0.479 3.292 
TSR_1YRt-1 0.097 0.411 -0.759 -0.154 0.077 0.291 1.619 
BRD_SIZE 10.452 1.977 6 9 10 12 16 
BRD_INDEP 0.839 0.088 0.556 0.800 0.875 0.909 0.929 
LEVERAGE 0.234 0.156 0.000 0.116 0.215 0.326 0.708 
FIRM_AGE 36.900 18.645 6 19 38 57 63 
MVE 8.859 1.237 5.787 8.001 8.689 9.646 12.191 
IOS -0.047 0.008 -0.057 -0.052 -0.049 -0.044 -0.011 
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TABLE 4 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics for non-RPE firms 
 MEAN SD MIN P25 MEDIAN P75 MAX 
Variables for investment efficiency analysis (N = 907) 
ASSETSt-1 8.842 1.198 6.156 8.005 8.701 9.635 12.104 
BMt-1 0.644 0.212 0.158 0.489 0.638 0.800 1.230 
TANGIBILITYt-1 0.315 0.243 0.017 0.112 0.239 0.471 0.872 
CASH_FLOWt-1 0.169 0.140 -0.044 0.083 0.125 0.215 0.660 
SLACKt-1 1.219 2.503 0.001 0.102 0.353 1.047 16.845 
OP_CYCLEt-1 4.660 0.598 2.790 4.359 4.669 4.979 6.208 
LOSSt-1 0.100 0.301 0 0 0 0 1 
DIVIDENDSt-1 0.718 0.450 0 0 1 1 1 
σCASH_FLOW 0.028 0.023 0.002 0.012 0.021 0.038 0.118 
σSALES 0.095 0.092 0.005 0.037 0.067 0.121 0.481 
σINVESTMENT 377.166 739.233 4.229 51.490 138.957 345.818 4,811.587 
CEO-CHAIR 0.638 0.481 0 0 1 1 1 
BRD_SIZE 10.380 2.101 6 9 10 12 16 
BRD_INDEP 0.836 0.086 0.556 0.800 0.875 0.900 0.929 
INSTOWN 0.703 0.280 0.000 0.669 0.803 0.876 0.993 
ANALYSTS 13.905 7.715 0 8 13 19 34 
Variables for firm performance analysis (N = 1,015) 
TSR_1YR 0.080 0.413 -0.775 -0.157 0.082 0.264 1.772 
TSR_2YR 0.217 0.673 -0.846 -0.199 0.113 0.460 3.292 
TSR_1YRt-1 0.086 0.419 -0.759 -0.171 0.082 0.291 1.619 
BRD_SIZE 10.466 2.174 6 9 10 12 16 
BRD_INDEP 0.837 0.087 0.556 0.800 0.875 0.900 0.929 
LEVERAGE 0.248 0.164 0.000 0.126 0.227 0.354 0.708 
FIRM_AGE 35.226 18.371 6 18 35 54 63 
MVE 8.864 1.386 5.787 7.924 8.731 9.789 12.191 
IOS -0.047 0.008 -0.057 -0.053 -0.050 -0.044 -0.011 
Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 5 
COVARIATE BALANCE FOR RPE AND NON-RPE FIRMS 
Panel A: Difference in means for selection variables prior to matching 
 NON-RPE  
(N=3,260) 
  RPE  
(N = 1,385) 
 
 Mean SD  Mean SD Difference in Means 
COMMON_RISK 0.366 0.212  0.447 0.201 -0.082*** 
SIZE_RKADJ 6.893 2.034  7.293 1.948 -0.399*** 
DIVERSITY_RKADJ 0.027 0.033  0.032 0.037 -0.004*** 
RETURN_RKADJ 0.054 0.082  0.043 0.066 0.011*** 
INDUSTRY_CONCENTRATION 0.065 0.059  0.051 0.051 0.014*** 
BM 0.622 0.262  0.709 0.220 -0.088*** 
MVE 8.434 1.298  8.927 1.232 -0.493*** 
ROA_INDADJ 0.054 0.104  0.047 0.093 0.007* 
RETURN_INDADJ 0.103 0.358  0.073 0.284 0.029** 
CEO_WEALTH 10.355 1.532  10.117 1.221 0.238*** 
CEO_AGE 54.432 7.066  55.499 5.411 -1.067*** 
TOP5_INSTOWN 0.320 0.133  0.313 0.121 0.008 
ACTIVIST_INSTOWN 0.013 0.008  0.014 0.007 -0.001*** 
CEO-CHAIR 0.543 0.498  0.655 0.476 -0.112*** 
BRD_INDEP 0.792 0.108  0.843 0.086 -0.051*** 
BRD_SIZE 9.823 2.264  10.643 2.038 -0.820*** 
COMPCONSULTANT 0.916 0.277  0.972 0.166 -0.055*** 
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Difference in means and distribution for selection model variables after matching 
 NON-RPE  
(N=1,015) 
  RPE  
(N = 1,015) 
  
 Mean SD  Mean SD Difference in Means P-value for  
Difference in Distribution 
COMMON_RISK 0.434 0.217  0.428 0.204 0.006 0.25 
SIZE_RKADJ 7.307 2.122  7.332 1.963 -0.025 0.45 
DIVERSITY_RKADJ 0.029 0.033  0.030 0.036 -0.001 0.36 
RETURN_RKADJ 0.048 0.074  0.049 0.072 -0.001 0.64 
INDUSTRY_CONCENTRATION 0.059 0.057  0.058 0.055 0.001 0.98 
BM 0.689 0.251  0.673 0.228 0.016 0.02** 
MVE 8.858 1.352  8.834 1.238 0.025 0.16 
ROA_INDADJ 0.051 0.099  0.057 0.101 -0.006 0.25 
RETURN_INDADJ 0.086 0.315  0.088 0.307 -0.003 0.33 
CEO_WEALTH 10.271 1.341  10.233 1.185 0.039 0.03** 
CEO_AGE 55.520 6.547  55.139 5.553 0.381 0.02** 
TOP5_INSTOWN 0.306 0.123  0.306 0.126 0.000 0.45 
ACTIVIST_INSTOWN 0.014 0.008  0.014 0.008 0.000 0.85 
CEO-CHAIR 0.629 0.483  0.621 0.485 0.008  N/A 
BRD_INDEP 0.834 0.090  0.834 0.091 0.000 0.99 
BRD_SIZE 10.444 2.236  10.419 2.056 0.026 0.64 
COMPCONSULTANT 0.964 0.188  0.963 0.190 0.001  N/A 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Panel A and B reports the difference in means prior to and after matching, respectively.  
Panel B also reports the p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions for continuous variables. 
Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 6 
RPE USE AND DEVIATION FROM EXPECTED INVESTMENT LEVELS 
Panel A: Likelihood of under-/overinvesting as a function of RPE use 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES UNDERINVEST OVERINVEST 
   
RPE -0.408*** -0.408*** 
 (-2.495) (-2.524) 
ASSETSt-1 0.989*** 0.984*** 
 (7.522) (7.352) 
BMt-1 -2.041*** -0.251 
 (-4.216) (-0.555) 
TANGIBILITYt-1 -1.999*** 0.160 
 (-2.611) (0.199) 
CASH_FLOWt-1 -0.777 -0.415 
 (-0.784) (-0.400) 
SLACKt-1 -0.029 0.037 
 (-0.699) (1.047) 
OP_CYCLEt-1 -0.334* -0.389** 
 (-1.661) (-1.971) 
LOSSt-1 -0.462* -0.630** 
 (-1.677) (-2.336) 
DIVIDENDSt-1 0.079 -0.353* 
 (0.384) (-1.671) 
σCASH_FLOW 2.412 5.481 
 (0.552) (1.414) 
σSALES -0.640 -0.162 
 (-0.568) (-0.143) 
σINVESTMENT 0.000 0.000 
 (0.686) (0.569) 
BRD_SIZE -0.107** -0.072 
 (-2.308) (-1.583) 
BRD_INDEP -0.301 -0.511 
 (-0.265) (-0.479) 
CEO-CHAIR -0.165 -0.076 
 (-0.874) (-0.404) 
INSTOWN 0.025 0.114 
 (0.101) (0.453) 
ANALYSTS 0.022 0.004 
 (1.595) (0.280) 
Constant -0.843 -3.569** 
 (-0.445) (-1.960) 
   
Observations 1,814 
Adjusted R2 0.166 
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TABLE 6 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel B: Likelihood of under-/overinvesting for RPE firms using custom peer groups and control firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES UNDERINVEST OVERINVEST UNDERINVEST OVERINVEST 
     
PEER_COMMONRISK -1.284*** -0.922***   
 (-3.658) (-2.663)   
PEER_DISSIMILARITY -0.015 -0.012   
 (-1.320) (-1.058)   
RPE   -0.843*** -0.602*** 
   (-4.455) (-3.127) 
ASSETSt-1 1.007*** 0.917*** 0.952*** 0.870*** 
 (7.026) (6.187) (6.402) (5.682) 
BMt-1 -2.463*** -0.753 -2.453*** -0.727 
 (-4.349) (-1.357) (-4.212) (-1.284) 
TANGIBILITYt-1 0.259 0.654 0.322 0.699 
 (0.388) (0.905) (0.483) (0.972) 
CASH_FLOWt-1 -0.331 0.010 -0.287 0.049 
 (-0.294) (0.009) (-0.253) (0.045) 
SLACKt-1 0.010 0.073** 0.011 0.073** 
 (0.263) (2.246) (0.280) (2.197) 
OP_CYCLEt-1 -0.076 -0.163 -0.078 -0.166 
 (-0.445) (-0.896) (-0.461) (-0.907) 
LOSSt-1 -0.633* -0.684** -0.677** -0.728** 
 (-1.953) (-2.137) (-2.111) (-2.291) 
DIVIDENDSt-1 0.170 -0.162 0.158 -0.171 
 (0.726) (-0.684) (0.681) (-0.724) 
σCASH_FLOW -2.334 4.581 -2.626 4.295 
 (-0.523) (1.157) (-0.591) (1.091) 
σSALES 0.609 -0.579 0.581 -0.585 
 (0.513) (-0.463) (0.496) (-0.477) 
σINVESTMENT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.440) (0.440) (0.351) (0.378) 
BRD_SIZE -0.075 -0.034 -0.074 -0.032 
 (-1.302) (-0.576) (-1.264) (-0.540) 
BRD_INDEP 1.405 2.395** 1.378 2.364** 
 (1.303) (2.076) (1.278) (2.045) 
CEO-CHAIR 0.221 0.278 0.221 0.275 
 (1.074) (1.344) (1.089) (1.347) 
INSTOWN -0.024 -0.055 -0.017 -0.047 
 (-0.076) (-0.164) (-0.054) (-0.140) 
ANALYSTS -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (-0.123) (-0.088) (-0.170) (-0.132) 
Constant -6.289*** -8.632*** -5.549*** -8.030*** 
 (-4.025) (-5.337) (-3.503) (-4.875) 
       
Observations 1,212 1,212 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.145 
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TABLE 6 (CONTINUED) 
Panel C: Univariate analysis of investment efficiency and future firm performance 
 EFFICIENT 
INVESTING 
(N = 1,028) 
UNDERINVESTING 
(N = 1,808) 
OVERINVESTING 
(N = 1,496) 
EFFICIENT – 
UNDERINVEST 
(T-STATISTIC) 
EFFICENT – 
OVERINVEST 
(T-STATISTIC) 
ROAGROWTH_2YR 0.284 0.128 -0.068 0.156 (1.40) 0.352*** (2.72) 
ROAGROWTH_2YR 0.331 0.221 0.068 0.109 (0.96) 0.263** (2.04) 
EPSGROWTH_2YR 0.523 0.298 0.131 0.225* (1.83) 0.392* (1.83) 
EPSGROWTH_3YR 0.523 0.363 0.234 0.160 (1.30) 0.289 (1.30) 
ΔTOBIN_2YR 0.047 -0.033 -0.024 0.080*** (6.14) 0.071*** (6.14) 
ΔTOBIN_3YR 0.071 -0.034 -0.016 0.105*** (7.73) 0.087*** (7.73) 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Panels A and B present multinomial logistic regression of investment efficiency (i.e., likelihood of being above, below or at expected investment levels). Each model is estimated with 
year and industry fixed effects. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. They are calculated based on robust standard errors that are adjusted using clustering by firm in Panels A and B. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 7 
RPE USE AND TSR PERFORMANCE 
Panel A: TSR performance for full propensity-matched sample 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TSR_1YR TSR_2YR 
     
RPE 0.013 (0.913) -0.009 (-0.368) 
BRD_SIZE -0.021*** (-4.100) -0.024*** (-2.887) 
BRD_INDEP 0.131 (1.372) 0.190 (1.243) 
LEVERAGE -0.037 (-0.522) -0.156 (-1.342) 
FIRM_AGE -0.000 (-0.845) -0.000 (-0.326) 
MVE 0.045*** (5.996) 0.027** (2.165) 
TSR_1YRt-1 -0.174*** (-6.733) -0.331*** (-9.499) 
IOS 0.236 (0.185) -0.757 (-0.376) 
Constant -0.112 (-0.873) -0.015 (-0.075) 
     
Observations 2,030 2,030 
Adjusted R2 0.323 0.327 
 
Panel B: TSR performance for propensity-matched RPE contracting on TSR and non-RPE firms 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TSR_1YR TSR_2YR 
     
RPE 0.037** (2.144) 0.023 (0.765) 
BRD_SIZE -0.020*** (-3.836) -0.016* (-1.705) 
BRD_INDEP 0.043 (0.364) 0.001 (0.004) 
LEVERAGE -0.099 (-1.266) -0.141 (-1.063) 
FIRM_AGE -0.001* (-1.705) -0.000 (-0.141) 
MVE 0.056*** (6.460) 0.030* (1.882) 
TSR_1YRt-1 -0.150*** (-5.081) -0.325*** (-8.105) 
IOS -1.560 (-1.137) -3.877* (-1.739) 
Constant -0.181 (-1.357) 0.079 (0.252) 
     
Observations 1,522 1,522 
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.284 
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TABLE 7 (CONTINUED) 
Panel C: TSR performance for propensity-matched RPE and non-RPE firms contracting on TSR 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TSR_1YR TSR_2YR 
     
RPE 0.137*** (3.455) 0.066* (1.118) 
BRD_SIZE -0.068*** (-5.388) -0.068*** (-2.960) 
BRD_INDEP 0.364 (1.586) 0.074 (0.193) 
LEVERAGE -0.339*** (-2.644) -0.509** (-2.242) 
FIRM_AGE -0.001 (-1.110) -0.000 (-0.046) 
MVE 0.100*** (5.362) 0.068*** (2.634) 
TSR_1YRt-1 -0.112* (-1.975) -0.275*** (-3.257) 
IOS -5.335** (-2.575) -5.113 (-1.545) 
Constant -0.325 (-0.987) -0.212 (-0.515) 
     
Observations 218 218 
Adjusted R2 0.574 0.427 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Each regression model is estimated with year and industry fixed effects. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on robust standard errors that are adjusted using clustering by firm. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 8 
FIRM PERFORMANCE AS A FUNCTION OF COMMON RISK 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES  TSR_1YR  TSR_2YR 
     
PEER_COMMONRISK 0.067** (2.008) 0.342** (2.240) 
PEER_DISSIMILARITY -0.001** (-2.054) 0.000 (0.306) 
BRD_SIZE -0.024*** (-4.156) -0.015 (-1.034) 
BRD_INDEP 0.105 (0.797) -0.101 (-0.310) 
LEVERAGE -0.076 (-1.050) -0.107 (-0.472) 
FIRM_AGE -0.000 (-0.257) 0.000 (0.203) 
MVE 0.051*** (5.467) 0.008 (0.356) 
TSR_1YRt-1 -0.186*** (-6.137) -0.353*** (-6.365) 
IOS 2.295 (1.611) 1.338 (0.387) 
Constant 0.085 (0.504) 0.239 (0.623) 
     
Observations  1,262  1,262 
Adjusted R2  0.328  0.357 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
The regressions use a propensity-matched sample of RPE firms benchmarking on a custom peer group and non-RPE firms. 
Each regression model is estimated with year and industry fixed effects. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on robust standard errors that are adjusted using clustering by firm. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 9 
FIRM PERFORMANCE SURROUNDING RPE ADOPTION 
Panel A: RPE adoption timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Annual TSR around adoption 
 
 
  
The sample consists of 84 firms that adopt RPE use and 84 non-RPE firms (propensity-matched) in the year before the switch to 
RPE (t-1), as well as the first, second, and third year after adoption (t, t+1, and t+2).  
Standard error bars are included to show whether the average between the two groups are statistically different from each other. 
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